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• Abstract 
'Health for All ' w i l l not be achieved by the year 2000 unless 
additional resources are recruited f o r health sectors of developing 
countries. The urmet needs f o r basic health care cannot be satisfied 
through better use of the existing health resources alone. The most 
premising domestic sources of additional health resources are the 
user fees, and uncommitted community resources. Unccmmitted community 
resources are incomes of communities which are not committed to the 
provision of basic needs, or to investments that are necessary to 
sustain existing standards of l i v ing . 
Foreign exchange i s a v i t a l input in. the provision of health 
services in developing countries. Mobilization of domestic resources 
for health sectors without increasing the ir : .• foreign exchange 
inputs could lead to a f a l l in the quality o f health services due 
for example to shortages in drugs. Ways of increasing supply of 
foreign exchange to health sectors of developing countries should be 
explored. 
Since Ministries of Health must make decisions regarding how 
much of various quantities o f health services t o provide before they 
actually receive their budgets, i t i s important f o r them to have a 
method of forecasting their budgets to avoid planning health activities 
that are not feas ib le . The paper contains a revenue prediction model 
that should be useful in planning and al locating budgets of the 
Ministries of Health. 
Two types of costs should be considered in 'designing health 
care delivery systems - costs of providing health services, and patients 
costs of using the services . The appropriate or cost-effective health 
care system is the System that minimizes the sum of these costs. It 
is argued in the paper that compared to alternative systems, a 
community based health care system in which the Government and the 
community share recurrent costs of health services i s the most" cost-
effective system. Cost-sharing arrangements in such a systen would 
include service f e e s , labour time contributions, prepayments for 
health services and community managed drug funds. 
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HEALTH SECTOR FINANCIAL ANALYSIS: A SURVEY* 
1 . o 
rh-» g o a l of good ' h e a l t h f o r a l l ' by th-1 y e a r 
2000 , or a t sorr^ o th^r u r g e n t d a t e w i l l n o t b 5 a c h i e v e d 
w i t h o u t a s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e o f r-?sDurc^s to th-? h e a l t h 
s e c t o r s o f t h j L^ss Deve loped C o u n t r i e s (LDCs) . A d d i t i o n a l 
r e s o u r c e s a r J r e q u i r e d in th^s-* s e c t o r s t o m c r e a s - 3 the 
s u p p l y o f p r e v e n t i v e and c u r a t i v e h e a l t h s ? r v i c ^ s , e s p e c i a l l y 
in the r u r a l ar - 5 as , where in rany LDCs, 1-^ss than 30 p j r ' 
c j n t o f th 3 p o p u l a t i o n i s c o v e r e d wi th rr.jdern h e a l t h s e r v i c e s , 
Sine-3 the Alrr.a a ta C o n f e r e n c e o f 1978, in which the c o n c e p t 
o f Frirr.ary Heal th Care was g i v e n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n , 
th-^re has be-sn rr.uch a c t i v i t y i n th J p l a n n i n g of r u r a l 
h e a l t h s ^ r v i o ^ s . However , t h i s p l a n n i n g has l a r g e l y been 
o n e - s i d ^ d . I t has f o c u s e d rrainly on the adrr inis t r a t i v e and 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l a s p e c t s o f h e a l t h s -^rv ic^s d e l i v e r y , 
on o p t i m a l s i z e s o f Rural Hea l th U n i t s through which g o v e r n -
ment h e a l t h s -^rv i c^s a r e p r o v i d e d to r u r a l com.rruni t i e s ; and 
on s u b s t i t u t i o n of m e d i c a l p r o f e s s i o n a l s with community 
h e a l t h w o r k e r s in the p r o v i s i o n of p r e v e n t i v e and b a s i c 
c u r a t i v e s e r v i c e s 
F i n a n c i a l p l a n n i n g - th-5 p l a n n i n g of s o u r c e s of 
'"unds, and how they rright b e s t be u t i l i z e d , has n o t r e c e i v e d 
much a t t e n t i o n from M i n i s t r i e s o f H e a l t h in a t t e m p t s to 
p r o v i d e Frirr.ary Hea l th Care . In o r d e r to e n s u r e c o n t i n u i t y 
of h e a l t h s e r v i c e s , and to a c h i e v e optinral u t i l i z a t i o n o f 
the a v a i l a b l e f a c i l i t i e s , h e a l t h s e r v i c e s managers n j e d to 
a d e q u a t e s o u r c e s of f u n d s , and to know the h ? a l t h 
a c t i v i t y a r e a s i n which a d d i t i o n a l f u n d s can b-; used most 
p r o d u c t i v e l y . 
This i s a revised version o f a paper that or ig ina l ly appeared as a 
consultancy report to WHO, Geneva entit led "Financial Health Planning", 
IDS, University o f Nairobi, October 1986. The paper benefited from 
comments at WHO, and an abridged version o f i t was published for Tech-
nical Discussions o f the World Health Assembly in May 1987, under the 
t i t l e "Options f o r Paying for Health Services in Afr i ca" . 
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This pap-^r e x p l o r e s a l t e r n a t i v e ways o f r a i s i n g 
f u n d s f o r h e a l t h s e c t o r s i n th 3 d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s with 
r e f e r e n c e t o s p e c i f i c c o u n t r y -^xp e r i e n c e s ; i d e n t i f i e s ^.r^as 
i n th-- h e a l t h s e c t o r which r e q u i r e p r i o r i t y i n the a l l o c a t i o n 
o f f i n a n c i a l b u d g e t ; s k e t c h e s a framework Tor f i n a n c i a l planning 
the health sector ; and d i s c u s s e s c o s t s o f a l t e r n a t i v e systeir.s 
o f h e a l t h c a r 3 d e l i v e r y i n s e l e c t e d LDCs. A surrrr.ary of 
f i n d i n p s c o n c l u d e s thr p a p j r . 
2 . 0 SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR FINANCING HEALTH SERVICES 
There a r j f o u r b a s i c s o u r c e s o f f u n d s f o r health 
s e c t o r s i n LDCs, narrely , g e n e r a l t a x a t i o n ; f o r e i g n aid 
and g r a n t s ; u s e r f e e s and unc orr.rr.i t ted community r e s o u r c e s . 
In the m a j o r i t y o f LDCs, government h e a l t h s e r v i c e s are 
f i n a n c e d wi th revenue from, g e n e r a l t a x a t i o n , wi th f o r e i g n 
exchange component o these s e r v i c e s b e i n g f i n a n c e d mainly 
by f o r e i g n a i d and g r a n t s . This mod-3 o f h e a l t h s e r v i c e s 
f i n a n c i n g enab les most LDC Governments to p r o v i d e modern 
h e a l t h c a r e c o v e r a g e to about 25-30% o f the p o p u l a t i o n . 
To 'xpand t h i s c o v e r a g e , a d d i t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s must be 
5* 
r e c r u i t e d r o r the government h e a l t h c a r e s e c t o r . One 
way to o b t a i n a d d i t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s i s by r a i s i n g the l e v e l 
or" g e n e r a l t a x a t i o n a n d / o r by n e g o t i a t i n g '"or a d d i t i o n a l 
f o r e i g n - a i d , l o a n s or g r a n t s This a l t e r n a t i v e i s u n l i k e l y 
to work f o r two r e a s o n s . F i r s t l y , many LDCs have v e r y small 
t a x a b l e capa :i t i e s , from, which a d d i t i o n a l tax revenue cannotbe 
g e n e r a t e d w i t h o u t a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t i n g work i n c e n t i v e s . For 
example , i n Kenya, th J wage e a r n e r s f rom whom a d d i t i o n a l 
revenue can be r a i s e d , number a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 m i l l i o n 0r 
about 5'":' of the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n . The t a x a b l e c a p a c i t y 
con o r c o u r s e be i n c r e a s e d by i n c l u d i n g non-wage earners 
(nrainly s e l f - e m p l o y e d o p e r a t o r s ) i n t o the tax n ^ t , but the 
' it The b a s i c assumpt ion h e r e i s t h a t an e x p a n s i o n i n health 
c a r e s e r v i c e w i l l l j a d to an improvement i n h e a l t h s ta tus . 
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cost or" tax c o l l e c t i o n would l i k e l y b^ p r o h i b i t i v e . 
Secondly, due to heavy i n t e r n a t i o n a l ind J b 1 5 dn • s s of v i r -
tua l ly a l l LDCs, and b e c a u s e o f t h e i r weak e x p o r t perforrr.anc Kia 
the LDCs a r e ^ l i k e l y t o n e g o t i a t e s u c c e s s f u l l y t o r a d d i t i o n a l 
f ore ign exchange from i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
The LDCs' a b i l i t y to r a i s e s u b s t a n t i a l f o r e i g n ^x iha ig - ; 
recourses f o r the i r h e a l t h s e c t o r s , on the b a s i s o f s t rengths 
of the i r econorries, i s e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d ( s e e e . g . , Lancaster 
and Will iamson, 1 9 8 6 ) . 
In l i g h t of the a b o v e , i t a p p e a r s t h a t the hope 
por add i t i ona l r e s o u r c e s f o r the p u b l i c h e a l t h s e c t o r s in 
LDCs l i e s in user c h a r g e s , and i n the uncommitted r e s o u r c e s 
or-> cotrruniti ?s. These two p o t e n t i a l methods o f r e c r u i t i n g 
funds f o r health s e c t o r s in LDCs a r e e x p l o r e d i n the e n -
suing s e c t i o n s . 
2 . 1 : User Charges 
Us:-r fees or c h a r g e s , as a m.-ans o f r a i s i n g 
add i t i ona l revenue f o r p u b l i c h e a l t h s e c t o r s , a r a a c c e p t e d in 
p r i n c i p l e in many LDCs, b u t t h e i r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n h a s , in 
general , proved to be v e r y d i f f i c u l t . For e x a m p l e , Kenya 's 
Ministry of Health Deve lopment F l a n , 1 0 8 4 - 1 9 8 6 ; and the 
overa l l Kenya's Development P l a n , 1 9 8 4 - 1 9 8 8 , s t a t e t h a t 
V . . . . A f e e w i l l be charg ed to p a t i e n t s i n amenity wards , 
corrmensurate with the s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d . S e l e c t i v e 
sharp :-s f o r hosp i ta l o u t - p a t i e n t and i n - p a t i e n t m e d i c a l s .-rvi 
— w i l l b? introduced d u r i n g the p i ^ n p e r i o d . " ( S t e v e n s 1934 
pp. - 50 -51 ) . I n s p i t e o f the a b o v e s t a t e m e n t s , s e l e c t i v e 
user f e e s are fnr from b e i n g i m p l e n t e d in Kenya. The major 
probl ;rr in the i r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n a p p e a r s to be a s t r o n g 
p o l i t i c a l commitm nt by Government to p r o v i d e f r e e med i ca l 
s e r v i c e s . 
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However, c a r e f u l e conomic a n a l y s i s suggests that 
a p o l i t i c - 1 commitment f o r f r e e m e d i c a l c a r e f o r a l l , 
may n o t b - c o n d u c i v e to h e a l t h s e r v i c e s e f f i c i e n c y , and 
c o n t r a r y t o i n t u i t i v e o b s e r v a t i o n s , i t very a l s o not b3 
e q u i t a b l - ' . Car l S t j v j n t 5 ( 1 9 8 4 , pp . 4 - F ) i n h is rep j r t on 
" A l t e r n a t i v e s f o r F i n a n c i n g H e a l t h S e r v i c e s m Kenya", 
p o i n t s out t h a t i n t r o d u c t i o n o1" u s e r c h a r g e s i r government 
h e a l t h f a c i l i t i e s would h j i p r a i s e th-3 q u a l i t y of the s e r -
v i c e s p r o v i d e d by those f a c i l i t i e s . Phis i s because the 
f'-;eS would bo th enab le the h e a l t h f a c i l i t y managers to 
p r o c u r e the n e c e s s a r y i n p u t s f o r the p r o v i s i o n of qual i ty 
h e a l t h c a r e , and a l s o a c t as an i n c e n t i v e f o r the f a c i l i t y 
managers to p r o v i d e q u a l i t y h e a l t h c a r e that consumers., 
( p a t i e n t s ) would be w i l l i n g to pay f o r . 
P h i l i p M u s g r o v e ( 1 9 8 6 , p . 333 ) argues that us^r 
f e e s would be u s e f u l in r e d u c i n g u n n e c e s s a r y or f r i v o l o u s 
demand f o r m e d i c a l s e r v i c e s , thus making i t p o s s i b l e to 
save rrore l i v e s w i t h o u t an i n c r e a s e in the supply of the 
a v a i l a b l e m e d i c a l s e r v i c e s . The u s e r c h a r g e s might a l so 
promote -qui ty b e c a u s e , i f they a r j charged s e l e c t i v e l y , 
s a y , to the urban p o p u l a t i o n that i s c l o s e to qual i ty 
h o s p i t a l care, they y-ould r a i s e c o s t of h o s p i t a l car^, rroking 
i t approach t h j c o s t f o r t h J r u r a l r e s i d e n t s who rrust pay 
s i g n i f i c a n t t r a n s p o r t and time o j S t s t o o b t a i n free t r e a t -
ment in urban based h o s p i t a l s . Thus, to borrow Ph i l ip 
M u s g r o v e ' s p h r a s e , us->r f - " s would tend to c r e a t e a s i t u a t i o n 
o f " e q u a l p r o b a b i l i t y o f r e c e i v i n g c a r e when i t i s needed" 
f o r r u r a l and urban p o p u l a t i o n s . I t has a l s o been 
d e m o n s t r a t e d (Mwabu, e t . a l . , 1986) that imposi t ion of 
u s e r f e e S i n c u r a I p u b l i c c l i n i c s can be red i s t r i b u t i v e in 
f a v o u r o f low income h o u s e h o l d s . This p o s s i b i l i t y however 
d e p e n d s c r i t i c a l l y on two a s s u m p t i o n s . The f i r s t assump-
t i o n i s that the revenue from u s e r f e e s be used to improve 
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qua l i ty of the ^ r v i o ^ s p r o v i d e d by th? p u b l i c c l i n i c s -
l a rge ly by supply ing them w i t h enough d r u g s . Th-3 s e cond 
assumption i s that the imposed u s e r f e e be a f f o r d a b l e by 
the rrpjority of the r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n . Under th^se a s s u m p t i o n s , 
low i n c o m e househo lds would b e n e f i t more than the h igh 
i n c o m e households from the improved s e r v i c e s o f s a y , r u r a l 
d i spensar i e s , because they would u s J t h e s e s e r v i c e s p r o -
p o r t i o n a t e l y more than h i g h income h o u s e h o l d s . The r e a s o n 
f o r this i s that b e f o r e s e r v i c e s o f r u r a l d i s p e n s a r i e s a r e 
improved, the r ich h o u s e h o l d s are a b l e to g e t m e d i c a l c a r e 
from a l t e r n a t i v e s o u r c e s . p.. d i s t r i c t h o s p i t a l s . Thus, 
the high income h o u s e h o l d s would n o t need the improved 
dispensary s e r v i c e s as much as the low income h o u s e h o l d s , 
and hence, the i r demand f o r these s e r v i c e s would be I j w j r than 
that f o r low income h o u s e h o l d s . 
Even though LDC Governments a r e r e l u c t a n t to 
impose user fees in p u b l i c c l i n i c s , t h j r : i s a good number 
of examples in LDCs where u s e r c h a r g e s on p u b l i c l y p r o v i d e d 
medical s e r v i c e s have worked q u i t e w e l l . 
B^kele and Lewis ( 1 9 8 6 , pp . 116-1.19) p o i n t o u t 
that us?r charges f o r government m e d i c a l s e r v i c e s i n the 
Sudan have not only managed to p r o v i d e more revenue w i t h 
which add i t i ona l s e r v i c e s can b-5 s u p p l i e d , b u t have a l s o 
improved the q u a l i t y o f , and demand f o r p u b l i c l y p r o v i d e d 
medical s e r v i c e s . Th 5 m.^lor i n n o v a t i o n in the f e e f o r -
s e r v i c e sch?m j in th ? Sudan are the even ing government 
c l i n i c s which charge f o r t h e i r s e r v i c e s . rhe - 'v^ning 
•clinics are simply the r e g u l a r government c l i n i c s i n the 
urban areas which are c o n v e r t e d i n t o p a y i n g c l i n i c s 
during th-" ^v>ning h o u r s . Between 8 . 3 0 A . M . and 2 . 0 0 F . M . , 
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t h e s e c l i n i c s p r o v i d e f r e e m e d i c a l c a r e , but between 6.00 
p it. and 9 . 0 0 p . r r . , they c h a r g e f o r t h e i r s e r v i c e s . 
The g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e that a p p e a r s to emerge 
from the e v e n i n g c l i n i c e x p j r iment i n the Sudan i s that i f 
u s e r f e e s in p u b l i c c l i n i c s a r e imposed a c c o r d i n g to 
s c a l e s which d i f f e r by t ime o f the day , i t might be 
p o s s i b l e to s i m u l t a n e o u s l y promote o b j e c t i v e s o f equity 
and e f f i c i e n c y in the p r o v i s i o n o f m e d i c a l s e r v i c e s . I t 
shou ld be no ted that B e k e l e and Lewis a l s o f ound that 
s e l e c t i v e i m p o s i t i o n o f u s e r c h a r g e s f o r h o s p i t a l s e r v i c e s 
i n the Sudan was c o n d u c i v e to b e t t e r q u a l i t y c a r e ; i t 
d i s c o u r a g e d f r i v o l o u s demand f o r m e d i c a l s e r v i c e s ; and in 
a d d i t i o n i t r a i s e d s u b s t a n t i a l amounts o f revenue without 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e d u c i n g demand f o r h e a l t h s e r v i c e s . This 
r e s u l t , h o w e v e r , r e s t s on a f u r t h e r f i n d i n g that h o s p i t a l 
c a r e i n the Sudan i s p r i c e i n e l a s t i c , i . e . , p a t i e n t s ' 
u t i l i z a t i o n o f h o s p i t a l s e r v i c e s i s n o t . v e r y s e n s i t i v e to 
c o s t s that they pay to o b t a i n those s e r v i c e s . (Bekele 
and Lewis e s t i m a t e that th 5 money p r i c e e l a s t i c i t y of demand 
f o r h o s p i t a l c a r - i n th? Sudan i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y - 0 . 1 3 ) 
S t u d i e s i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s lend s u p p o r t to the 
h y p o t h e s i s t h a t the u s e r c h a r g e s j o p u b l i c h o s p i t a l 
v . e r v i c e s would r a i s e a d d i t i o n a l r evenue f o r th * Government 
( th M i n i s t r v or" l ^ a l t h ) w i t h o u t a p p r e c i a b l y l ower ing 
u t i l i s a t i o n l e v e l s f o r those s e r v i c e s . A s u r v e y o f ten 
h e t l t h i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Honduras found t h a t a p r i c e of US 
£ 4 - 5 p >r v i s i t to a h o s p i t a l , d i d not d i s c o u r a g e pat i ents 
prorr u s i n g h o s p i t a l s e r v i c e s . However , h i g h e r v i s i t 
p r i c e s l e d to 'ewer p 3 o p ' . ? u s i n g h o s p i t a l s e r v i c e s 
( f a l l e n and R i n e h a r t , 1988 pp . 8 3 2 - 3 3 3 ) . A s i m i l a r 
p a t t e r n was found m B r a z i l . However , r e v e n u e s from us-\" 
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charges did not c over rrore than 11 p ? r c e n t o f c o s t o f 
hosp i ta l care." Ca l l en and R i n e h a r t f u r t h e r r e p o r t that i n 
Zai~e, even when the a v e r a g e c o s t p e r v i s i t i s the same, 
the rate ^f o l i n i c u t i l i z a t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t d e p e n d i n g on 
whether p a t i e n t s are charged a f i x e d f e e f o r each v i s i t 
they rake f o r a g iven i l l n e s s , o r fire c h a r g e d a s i n g l e 
given i l l n e s s i r r e s p e c t i v e o f the number o f t i rres 
they v i s i t a c l i n i c t o cur-1 t h a t i l l n e s s . C l i n i c s t h a t 
o'T-.-r^d i n i t i a l l y h i g h e r 3 ee , b u t o f f e r e d f r e e f o l l o w - u p - c a r e 
were u t i l i z e d rror- than thos - that charged l o w e r f e e s f o r 
each v i s i t 
Th j general p r i n c i p l e t h a t a p p e a r s to be s u p p o r t e d 
by this s p e c i f i c Z a i r e a n c a s e i s that u s e r f e e s s h o u l d 
be imposed by typ-3 o f i l l n e s s , and n o t by s t a g e o f an 
i l l n e s s That i s , p a t i e n t s s h o u l d be c h a r g e d on ly f o r 
f i r s t v i s i t s , the amount charged g e n e r a l l y d i f f e r i n g by 
type of i l l n e s s . 
recent s t u d y in K :nya ( I k i a r a and Kimani , 1986 ) 
has shown that the m a j o r i t y o f Kenyans are w i l l i n g t o pay 
f"or p u b l i c l y suppl ied h ? a l t h s e r v i c e s , p r o v i d e d t h a t they 
are of s u f f i c i e n t q u a l i t y . This i s e v i d e n c e d by the f a c t 
that many Kenyans a r a l r e a d y p a y i n g s u b s t a n t i a l amounts 
of m.on-*y 'or medical s e r v i c e s in n o n - g o v e r n m e n t h e a l t h 
s e c t o r . 
Table 1 b e l o w shows p e r c e n t a g e s of out p a t i e n t s 
oaying f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n and d r u g s i n n o n - g o v - rnm.ent h e a l t h 
f a c i l i t i e s m v a r i o u s p r o v i n c e s in Kenya. 
7; 
A recent study in Zaire has shown that in some Zairean health zones, user 
foes cover as much as 80 per cent o f operating costs (Marty Makinen o f 
REACH, personal communication). 
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T a b I j 1 ; p e r c e n t a g e o f p a t i e n t s i n t e r v i e w e d in government 
h e a l t h f a c i l i t i e s , who a t one t ime, had v i s i t e d 
n o n - g o v e r n m e n t f a c i l i t i e s where t'n jy paid con-
s u l t a t i o n and drug ' " ees . 
1 1 1 
1 
P e r c e n t a g e o f p 
h a v i n g p a i d the 
n t i e n t s who re 
f o l l o w i n g f e j 
p o r t ed 
s* 
j PROVINCE 
1 1 1 1 
Less than 
KShs. 5 
KShs 
100 
. 5 KShs 101 
500 
KShs 501 -t 
i 
" 1 
[ C e n t r a l 0 . 0 0 39 .87 8.78 4 .73 
1 . j rJyanza 1 . 22 47 .56 3.65 1.22 
j Western 0 . 0 0 57 .00 5 .00 0.00 
i R i f t V a l l e y 1 .39 29 .17 11.11 0.00 
E' 's t 1 rn 0 . 0 0 51 .22 4.88 1 2.44 
Nai r obi 0 . 0 0 20 .69 10.35 0.00 
Coas t 0 . 00 15 . 0 0 15.00 0.00 
! I . . . . . . .^ 1 
Average P e r c e n t a g e 
(Sample s i z e = 291) 
0 . 3 6 35 . 76 1 
1 
1 
8 40 
J 
j 
1.20 
1 1 
* 1 US D o l l a r i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y KShs. 1 6 . 0 0 
S o u r c e : D e r i v e d from T k i a r a and Kim.ani, Table 11,p.99 
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As can be seen from table 1 the fee paid by the majority of 
patients (35%) who sought medical treatment outside the government health 
sector, ranged from about US $ 0.3C to $ 6.0U. Only a small proportion of 
patients paid treatment fees exceeding Kshs.lGO (approximately $6.00). This 
result suggests that unless f ee setting takes into account patients ' willingness 
to pay for medical services, fees would discourage health f a c i l i t y u t i l i za t i on . 
Thus, once a political decis ion to charge f o r medical services i s made, the 
next critical question to answer i s : what is the best structure of fees to 
charge? This question has recently been examined theoret ica l ly by Philip 
Musgrove (1986), but research i s needed to answer i t in a prac t i ca l manner. 
The preceding discussion points to the fac t that when properly 
instituted, user fees can generate substantial funds to finance expansion of 
government health services. However, since i t i s common knowledge that people 
are generally unwilling to pay f or preventive health serv ices , funds t o f inance 
these services cannot be generated through user fees . 
2.2; Uncommitted COnWiunity 'Resources 
Apart from user f e e s , uncommitted community resources are another 
potential source of additional funds f o r health sectors in LDCs.1 By 
uncommitted community resources we mean the resources available to the house-
holds for discretionary use. That i s , resources that are not committed to 
meeting basic survival needs of households. The uncommitted community 
resources are not merely community's saving, because part of that saving 
might be committed to investments that are required to sustain the prevail ing 
standards of living. The uncommitted resources might consist of money, time, ana 
and assets such as land, l i v e s t o c k , and farm equipment. 
The concept of community f inancing, as is currently used in the 
health services financing l i t e r a t u r e , i s not very helpful in pract i ca l 
financial health planning because i t i s not used in re lat ion to uncommitted 
community resources. The question that naturally arises t o mind now i s how 
may the size of uncommitted resources in a community be estimated, and what 
methods can be used to induce the community to voluntari ly release some of 
it to the health sector? 
- 1 0 -
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One prac t i ca l way to estimate the amount of a community's 
uncommitted resource i s t o estimate i t s expenditures on luxury items. 
Obviously, what i s a luxury item wi l l vary from one community to another, 
and observers from outside the community are l ike ly to have great d i f f i cu l -
t i e s in identi fying i t . Nonetheless, in consultation whd-A-h key informants ir 
communities, i t should be re la t ive ly easy to ident i fy luxury items for 
s p e c i f i c communities. For example, in a community in Western Kenya, luxury 
might 
items/include wrist watches; motor-vehicles; processed foods , certain types 
of s o c ia l f e s t i va l s ; tourism tr ips outside the community; and so on. unce 
these items are i d e n t i f i e d , a random sample of households from the community 
can be se lected , and their expenditures on items designated as luxuries can 
be determined. The expenditure on these items would then be an approximation 
to the s ize of uncommitted resource in the community. Notice that time 
expedniture i s a component of expenditure on luxuries , and wi l l have to be 
converted into money expenditure. There are problems in doing this (of 
placing monetary value on households' t ime) , but encouraging progress has 
been made in resolving the methodological and theoret ica l issues involved ( 
(see e .g . Wang'ombe (1984)). 
Objects of luxurious or discretionary expenditure in a community 
can also be detected using formal methods o f economic analysis , such as the 
regression technique. Demand equations for major goods ana services purchased 
in the community can be estimated. Goods and services that turn out to .have 
demands that are highly e las t i c with respect to income can then be considered 
as luxurious items. In other words, these are items f or which purchases 
increase proportionately more than proportionate increases in households' 
income. In less prec ise terms, they are items that households would buy only 
i f their income l eve l s are such that they are already buying goods and 
services that are necessary to sa t i s fy basic needs. Once demand equations have 
been estimated and luxury items i a e n t i f i e d , t o ta l discretionary expenditure 
in a community can be determined f o r any given l eve l of income. This formal 
determining 
method of the amount of uncommitted resources in community his the 
advantage over the method described ear l i e r because, a f t e r estimating 
demand equations, one only need to know the community's income to compute 
discretionary expenditure. The required data can be obtained from 
national household data sets available in planning ministries of many LDCs. 
In many instances, there would l ike ly be no need to conduct the usually 
very expensive household surveys. 
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After the amount of uncommitted community resource has be^n 
estimated, the next c r i t i ca l step in f inancia l health planning i s how this 
resource can be mobilized f o r the health sector . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the 
issue is how the uncommitted resource can be harnessed in a voluntary manner, 
to finance certain health care services . 
Russell and Reynolds (1986,pp.17-22), discuss the fol lowing 
methods of inducing the community to finance s p e c i f i c health services. 
a) Personal'Service Fees. These are fees f o r the services rendered 
by health workers. They d i f f e r from user charges (or f e e s ) in that they are 
meant primarily to meet the opportunity cost of time of the person providing 
the service; however, as in the case of user f e e s , they can also be used to 
cover costs of drugs and medicines. The community resources that are mobilized 
through personal service fees are commonly used to support community health 
workers. However, this method of resource mobilization has the disadvantage 
that it generates funds mainly to support community - based curative 
services, because as was pointed out e a r l i e r , people are generally unwilling 
to pay for preventive health services. It should be stressed that in order 
for personal fees to succeed in mobilizing the uncommitted community resource 
for the health sector, they must be levied according to peoples willingness 
to pay for the health services that the fees are intended to support, but how 
is willingness to pay to be determined? Brief ly , th is can be lone through . 
household surveys; details of determination o f will ingness to pay f or medical 
care is outside the scope of th i s paper. 
Df1^ 'Sales. This method of extracting uncommitted community resource 
involves the selling of basic drugs in s p e c i f i c communities. The drugs are 
stored in community pharmacies, or in general r e t a i l shops. The i n i t i a l stock 
of drugs can be established through a grant t o the community, with arrangements 
to establish the grant as a revolving drug fund. That i s , the proceeds from 
the sale of drugs would always be used t o purchase new stocks o f drugs. 
The revolving drug fund should part icular ly be at tract ive to the community i f 
prices of the basic drugs that are made available by the fund are set below those 
of similar drugs in private pharmacies by subsidizing pr ices of drugs in 
2 
community pharmacies using public funds. The public subsidy 
to community drug stores would be a device f o r inducing the community to spend 
part of its uncommitted resource to f inance the cost of drugs that are needed 
for Primary Health Care. In other words, the subsidy i s an inst i tut ional 
arrangement between the community and the Government for sharing the cost o f 
drugs in primary health care. Black marketing o f drugs is a potential 
problem in a revolving drug fund scheme. The major advantage of this scheme 
is that p r o f i t s frcrn drug .sales can be used t o support Loth curative and 
preventive health a c t i v i t i e s . 
c) Personal and Traduction - 'Based Prepayments. These health-care 
financing arrangements involve paying f o r health services before an illness 
occurs. Health services prepayments are forms o f insurance schemes. 
Personal prepayment and production-based prepayment d i f f e r from one another 
in the fol lowing way: In personal prepayment schemes, households or 
individuals contribute d i re c t l y ( in cash or in kind) t o an insurance scheme. 
In product ion-based prepayment programs, households or individuals contribute 
to the insurance scheme through l ev i es on the output they sell. 
The prepaid health services are equally availdble to all members 
of the scheme irrespect ive of d i f f erences in the ir i l lnesses , health status 
or a b i l i t y to x^ay. Thus, in health insurance schemes, the healthy individuals 
subsidize the s i ck , because the health services they pay for are used'by 
those who are sick. Prepaid health services schemes are reported to have 
functioned successful ly in Indonesia and China. In Kenya, there appears to 
be great potential of financing health services through product ion-based 
prepayment schemes because the majority of small scale farmers are members 
of cooperatives. But, unless some nominal fees are imposed at the time of 
use, prepaid health services are l i k e l y to face problems o f over-utilization. 
d) Community and. Individual Labor. This i s labor that the community or 
individuals volunteer f o r health a c t i v i t i e s . Community or communal-labor 
might be volunteered to construct dispensaries; to build latrines; to improve 
environmental sanitation; and so on. Individual labor might for example be 
volunteered f or immunization camapigns, health education, and distribution 
of family planning materials. Although voluntary labor can be used to lcwer 
both the recurrent and development expenditures o f primary health care, i t 
is known to be d i f f i c u l t to sustain f o r a long time. However, an experiment 
on Community-based health care scheme at Kibwezi in Kenya (operated by African 
Medical and Research Foundation, Nairobi ) , has shown that when properly 
recruited and trained, unpaid community health workers can be retained on 
health a c t i v i t i e s for a long time (see SIDA/MOH/aMREF (Kenya), £985). 
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e) Ccrtffiunity Contributions. These may take a variety o f forms e . g . cash, 
materials, land, and l ivestock. In some communities, a substantial amount 
of resources can be mobilized through fund ra is ing . In Kenya f o r instance, 
many dispensaries have been bui l t with se l f -he lp ("Harambee") contributions 
(see e.; . , Mbithi and Ra^musson, 1977). Community contributions are commonly 
used tc finance one-time expenditures such as the construction of health 
fac i l i t ies . 
The extent to which the above methods w i l l succeed in mobilizing 
community resources to finance health services depends on four key f a c t o r s , 
name ly; 
1) Community's understanding o f reasons why i t should contribute 
to finance health services which were previously provided f ree 
of charge; 
2) type of health services to be financed; 
3) level of training o f those involved in the management of 
mobilized resources - in s k i l l s such as book-keeping, budgeting, 
inventory planning e t c . ; and 
4) type of supervision and support that i s provided to community 
health care financing schemes by the Ministry of Health. 
The fourth point above is extremely important because, a community wi l l 
often need outside assistance for i t s health care financing system in such 
natters as budgeting, f inancial contro l , and planning. This sort o f 
assistance can be provided by o f f i c i a l s of the Ministry o f Health through 
short-term training courses f o r those involved in the management of community 
health care financing schemes such as the revolving drug fund. 
2.3: Summary 
This section summarizes and comments on basic issues related to 
user fees and uncommitted community resources as sources o f addit ional 
funds for health sectors in LLCs. 
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Selective user charges on health serv ices , i . e . charges that are 
imposed only in some health f a c i l i t i e s ; or in certain period o f the day°, in 
s p e c i f i c geographic regions or f o r certain health disorders , are a potential 
source of additional funds for the health sectors . However, people 's 
willingness to pay user fees depends c r i t i c a l l y on whether they consider 
the services on which fees are imposed t o he o f s u f f i c i e n t quality. Health 
service quality has three major dimensions. The f i r s t i s the pat ients ' 
subjective perceptions, or a t t i tudes , of what quality health care i s . The 
second dimension o f health service quality i s made up o f the quality o f 
the medical inputs (as judged by health pro fess iona ls ) , that are used t o 
provide a particular health service . I t should be noted here that consumers 
(pat ients ) , may not agree with the health profess ionals ' rating of the 
quality of a particular health service . The third major dimension o f 
quality o f service consists o f the behaviour and att itudes of health 
workers toward patients. 
Al l the aspects o f health service qual i ty , mentioned above a f f e c t 
people ' s willingness t o pay for health serv ices , and hence the amount of 
revenue that can be raised through user fees . Thus, the issue o f health 
service quality ( ob jec t ive and sub jec t ive ) , should be given careful 
attention in the design and implementation of user fee schemes. 
User charges would succeed in rais ing revenue mainly for curative 
services. Funds to finance preventive and promotive health care would have to 
be raised through compulsory methods such as taxation. 
Uncommitted community resource i s a useful conce t t in evaluating, 
a community's potential to part ic ipate in the financing o f health services . 
Uncommitted community resource can be approximate d by expenditures on 
luxuries. Ways o f harnessing some of this resource f o r the health sector 
include, service fees ; drug sales ; prepayments for medical care; community 
labor; and community contributions. 
In concluding th i s section a point o f fundamental importance 
regarding the relationship between mobilization o f domestic resources f o r 
the health sec tor , and the quality o f health services should be mentioned. I f 
foreign exchange a binding constraint in the provision o f health 
serv i ces , then mobilization o f additional domestic resources f o r the health 
sector could lead to a f a l l in the quality of the health services provided. 
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This i s because as more health f a c i l i t i e s ore b u i l t , through 
communal labor , the complementary inputs, such as drugs (that must be 
procured with foreign exchange), may not be available in s u f f i c i e n t 
quantities (see David Dunlop and Mead QyerJ'.Jr. ,1985)r. This suggests 
a need to compute a desired raitio Uf domestic health core inputs to foreign 
inputs. This"ratio would be useful, in indicating wh'en a given country i s 
mobilizing too many domestic health core resources re lat ive to the available 
foreign exchange inputs. The ra t i o would also be helpful to foreign donors 
interested in ass is t ing LDGe that are most severely constrained by foreign 
exchange shortages in th^ir primary health care programmes. Thus,: i f 
additional domestic resources f o r the health sector are to have tbe i r 
t 
intended impact o f improving health status, thoy should not be mobilized 
car planned in i so lat ion from the complementary foreign inputs that are also ! i 
required in the provision o f primary health care. . 
3.0: • ALLOCATION"OF"HEALTH'BUDGET 
Kenyan data (on. pattern o f a l locat ion o f health budget) shows 
that hospital based curative services receive the l i o n ' s share of the Ministry 
of Health budget. Promotive and preventive health a c t i v i t i e s receive 
approximately 5-6 per cent o f health budget, while curative services get 
about 68 per cent. CarliStevens (1984,p. 29) , points o'ut that Kenya's 
pattern of a l l o cat i on o f health budget i s typ ica l of;many other l e ss 
J ' , • I 
Developed Countries. t-
A " - ' ' • 1 I 
' ' i r I 
Table 2 below fehows the Kenya M:nistry o f Health (MOH) Recurrent 
Dudget by major health a c t i v i t i e s for the period 1978/79-1982/83. 
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According to available estimates, the pattern o f Kenya MOH 
budget spending as displayed in table 2 is essential ly unchanged f o r the 
period 1983/U - 1987/88. There are two basic observations from Table 2 
regarding Primary Health Care as a strategy f o r achieving good health 
for a l l Kenyans by the year 2000. The f i r s t point is that since , 
hospital services are urban based, the pattern o f budget spending 
displayed i s biased in favour of urban residents, who comprise only 
about 15 per cent o f the Kenyan population. Since the re ferra l system 
between hospitals and rural health f a c i l i t i e s does not function as 
desired (due to communication and transport problems), the spending 
pattern depicted in Table 2 is extremely inequitable; further, i t i s 
unlikely to improve health status o f the rural populations by a 
s igni f i cant margin. The second observation from Table 2 i s that 
preventive and promotive health services given very low pr i o r i ty in 
budget a l locat ions ( r e la t i ve to curative serv i ces ) , even though they are an 
important component o f the Primary Health Care strategy. 
The above observations tempt me to hazard the conclusion that 
good health f o r .all Kenyans wi l l "net be achieved by the year 2000 (or 
even by the year 20501), unless the pattern of MOH spending re f l e c ted 
in Table 2 i s changed. This i s because the majority of the population 
(rural and urban a l i k e ) , w i l l continue to su f fer from preventable 
d i s e a s e s b e c a u s e o f u n d e r - p r o v i s i o n o f preventive and promotive 
health services, and also due to the fact that, basic health services wi l l 
continue to be inaccessible to majority of the population. To a large extent, 
the foregoing pessimistic conclusion can be generalized to many other LDCs 
because as was stated e a r l i e r , their health budget a l locat ions are similar 
to Kenya's. 
The c r i t i c a l question is whether or not the pattern of health 
budget al locat ions shown in table 2 c?n in fact be altered in any 
s ign i f i cant way; and i f so how? I t is possible to s i g n i f i c a n t l y change-
health budget al locat ions shown in table 2 through tw<-. routes. The 1 '. 
f i r s t avenue c f change i s the • medical preofess-icnals who should 
encourage (or innovate) curative health care technologies that are 
suitable f o r use in rural health centres and dispensaries; or even in 
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people 's homes. The oral rehydration technologies are a s ign i f i cant 
step in this direct ion. The second way of changing the current pattern 
o f budget al locat ions (between curative and preventive health services) 
is to demonstrate to policy-makers (by research f indings ) , the 
benef i ts o f preventive health services . I t is now widely accepted that 
this manner o f informing policy-making would be most f r u i t f u l i f i t is a 
result of a col laborative research e f f o r t between researchers and p c l i c y -
mak ers. 
In concluding this sect ion, the folio-wing points should be 
noted. F irs t , additional resources to the health sector in Kenya (and in 
other LDCs) should be al located to preventive and rural health 
a c t i v i t i e s . Expenditures on these a c t i v i t i e s are more l i k e l y to 
achieve s ign i f i cant improvements in health f o r .all by the year 2000 than 
expenditures on urban based curative health services . This i s a 
familiar point , but which cannot be over-emphasized. The second point is 
that budget a l locat ion in health sectors should be rationalized,, i . e . 
•sBMsfcr-^ ift- economic techniques o f cost -benef i t analysis and c o s t - e f f e c t i v e -
ness analysis should be used as much as poss ible in deciding the pattern 
o f health budget a l l ocat ion that is most b e n e f i c i a l . In the context o f 
o f Primary Health Care Strategy, a budget a l locat ion that is most 
bene f i c ia l i f . . i t ' maximizes the chances of achieving good health for a l l 
by the year 2000. 
1+. 0: A FRAMEWORK FOR PLANNING AND ALLOCATING HEALTH BUDGET* 
Having discussed the sources and uses o f funds in health 
sectors a model that can be used for planning and a l locat ing f inancial 
health rosourcos w i l l now be presented. The model has three components, 
namely:-
1) determination of expected health budget. 
2) a l l ocat ion o f the budget among program a c t i v i t i e s ; and 
3) sens i t iv i ty analysis on the pattern c f resource a l locat ion . 
For an application o f a similar framework o f health sector f inancia l 
analysis in a developing country, see A. G r i f f i t h s and M. Mills (1982). 
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4.1 : Exyected Budget 
Health se rv i ces , l i k e other economic goods and serv i ces , 
take time to provide; Thus, in order f o r MOH to provide these goods 
on time, their production must begin before the MOH actually pets i t s 
own funds to pay f o r these services. ( I n i t i a l l y production o f these 
ervices can be financed by debt incurred by MOH). In order f o r the 
!!0H to know whether or not i t w i l l be able to pay f o r the services 
whose production i t starts be fore the receipt o f i t s funds, i t must have 
a way o f predicting i t s revenue. The MOH can predict i t s budget using 
the following simple model. 
Rt = P1(AID) + $,-,(FEE) + 83(UCR) + g^TAX) + 6 (OTH) 
where 
R = Expected Revenue or Budget in year t L> 
AID = Foreign aid and grants pledged by foreign doners to MOH. 
= Proportion of AID that i s paid. This number is obtained 
by dividing AID paid up during some past per iod, by AID 
pledged over the same period. Hie assumption here i s that 
donors pay only a f ract ion o f the AID they promise; and that 
the i r past behaviour w i l l pers is t into the future. 
FEE = Maximum amount o f revenue obtainable from user fees based 
on f a c i l i t y u t i l i z a t i o n rates and the prevail ing user 
charges. 
B^ = Proportion o f foe that i s expected to be co l l e c ted . 
UCR = An estimate o f uncommitted community resources 
. = Proportion o f UCR expected to be c o l l e c t ed 
3 
TAX = Total tax revenue 
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= Proportion o f TAX expected to be al located to MOH by the 
Central Government Planners and by l e g i s l a t o r s . 
OTH = Other types o f revenue for MOH, e .g . , domestic loans, 
savings , e t c . 
„ Proportion o f OTH that i s expected to be available f o r 
5 use by MOH.' 
The values o f parameters, - are obtained using past data in a 
manner similar to that described f or The value o f the above model 
in the planning of f inancial resources f o r MOH should be evident. 
Given values f o r AID, FEE, e t c . , and those o f the associated 
parameters, i . e . $ , and so on, the health planner can forecast 
the MOH budget f o r any year. He can thus, t e l l the amount o f health 
services the MOH can a f ford to produce in that year. I t i s quite 
easy to use this model since i t s parameters can be computed with 
l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y , and i t s variables ( e . g . , AID, TAX), can be 
determined with the help o f Central Government Planners. Also notice 
that the revenue model s p e c i f i e d above can be generalized by viewing 
R^  as a function o f AID, FEE etc . , without speci fy ing the functional 
form o f R , The parameters o f the function, R can then be estimated with t t 
formal methods o f regression analysis. 
^.2: Budget Allocation 
Once the planner has determined the expected health budget 
for year t , the next task . is to a l locate the budget among health 
ac t iv i t i e s planned f or that year. The expenditure required to cariy out 
health a c t i v i t i e s f o r year t , cannot exceed the expected budget f o r 
that year. In symbols, the health planner al locates his budget 
according, to the fol lowing rule. 
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a iCA t + a2PAt + a3OAt < R t> 
where . 
CA^  = Curative a c t i v i t i e s planned for year t t 
PA = Preventive a c t i v i t i e s f o r year t t 
OA = Other health related a c t i v i t i e s in year t . 
a^ = Average expenditure per curative ac t iv i ty 
a,. and a^ are defined s imilar ly . The values of a^, a 0 and a^ are 
derived from past expenditure data and pol icy emphases. The a c t i v i t i e s 
in the above expression, e.g. CA are assumed to be chosen usin.^ c o s t -u 
e f fect iveness c r i t e r i a . That i s , . o n l y c o s t - e f f e c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s are undertaken. 
An ac t iv i ty i s c o s t - e f f e c t i v e i f i t represents 
j_ the cheapest poss ible way o f achieving a given health ob jec t ive e . g . , 
reducing infant mortality rate by 30$ by year t (see e .g . Shepard and 
Thompson, 1979). The budget a l l ocat ion rule spec i f i ed above ensures 
sustenabil ity o f planned health a c t i v i t i e s . 
It. 3: Sens i t iv i ty Analysis 
Sensit iv i ty analysis involves changing values o f parameters 
that are not known with certainty e.g. , a 0 in the budget a l l ocat ion 
expression, and then studying the consequence of that change on decision 
rule. With reference to the budget a l locat ion expression, sens i t i v i ty 
analysis would he l j answer the fol lowinr questicn: Suppose a^ were to 
rise by 15$, would the bundle o f a c t i v i t i e s denoted by PA s t i l l be 
undertaken? 
The model of f inancial health planning presented in this 
sect ion i s useful in predict ing NDH budget; in the a l locat ion o f that 
budget among programme a c t i v i t i e s ; and in determining the sens i t iv i ty o f 
composition o f chosen health a c t i v i t i e s to changes in the ir average 
costs ( espec ia l ly the recurrent cos ts ) . 
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5.0 COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
5.1 Alternative lie^hth Care Systems 
This sect ion b r i e f l y discusses costs o f three types of 
Government managed health care systems, namely: -
1) Faci l i ty-based health care system. In this system, public 
health services are provided predominantly by health professions^ 
through f ixed health f a c i l i t i e s (hospi ta ls , health centres 
and dispensaries) . The health services are provided free of 
charge. 
2) Community-based ileal th care system without cost-sharing 
between the community and the Government. In this system, .the 
community is involved in the provision of health services, especially 
preventive and promotive health serv i ces , through village 
health committees; community health workers; and traditional 
b ir th attendants. The community works closely with Government 
-iiccu.ua yroxessaonais in tne planning and delivery of health 
serv i ces , but does not share with Government the recurrent cost 
o f health services . 
3) Community-based health care system with cost-sharing. 
5* 2: Costs o f Health Care Systems 
The basic problem here i s to determine the cost-effective health 
care system. Cost-ef fect iveness must o f course be defined with reference 
to some ob ject ive or purpose. I f the ob jec t ive o f MOH is to maximize the 
proportion o f the population that is covered with basic health services, 
a health care system is c o s t - e f f e c t i v e i f i t achieves this objective at 
l east cost. The claim in this sect ion is that "Community-based health 
care system with cost-sharing" i s the c o s t - e f f e c t i v e method of 
organizing health services delivery in most LDCs. Conceptually, this 
can be i l lus t rated by considering two categories o f health care costs, 
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namely, provider and consumer costs. Provider costs are the Government's 
c - s t s (development and recurrent) o f making health services available 
to communities. Consumer costs are the patients ' costs o f using the 
services , such as transport and time costs. The sum of these two 
costs , constitutes the total c>~>st o f a health care system. 
For many LDCs, fac i l i ty -based health care system is not even a 
feasible system, i f their aim is to achieve universal coverage o f the 
population with basic health services. This i s because the cost o f this 
system would exceed the MOH budget. In the case of Kenya, i t has been 
estimated that universal coverage o f the population with health centre 
services "would almost double the (MDH) budget for 19 8U fromK£76.5 
million to about KOM mill ion" (Mwangi and Mwabu, 1986, p. 778). 
Using, Malaysian and Kenyan data, Peter Heller (1975, 1971) has 
demonstrated that the fac i l i ty -based health carc system implies recurrent cost 
burdens which are unlikely to be borne by revenue from general taxation 
alone. Thus, even for an LDC government which might a f ford establishing 
fac i l i ty -based care system for the whole population, i t is unlikely to 
sustain the system because of recurrent cost problems. Heller (1975, 
p .69) , notes that for Malaysia and Kenya, the recurrent cost burdens are 
greater f or smaller health center inst itutions - precisely the f a c i l i t i e s 
that would be vised to achieve universal health services coverage. 
Hel ler 's work shows that f or every dollar (or sh i l l ing ) required to 
construct and equip a health centre or a dispensary, approximately 23-27 
cents are required to operate and maintain i t . For hospitals , the 
recurrent cost burden is 11-18 cents f or each dol lar or sh i l l ing o f 
capital expenditure. 
"Community-based health care system without cost sharing" is a 
feasible system of achieving the goal o f 'health for a l l ' as urgently as 
possible. This is because universal health services are possible under this 
syst em. Each community, i rrespect ive o f i t s geograrhic l o cat ion , is 
responsible in some way, for the provision o f i t s health services. 
However, this system is l ike ly to be more costly than the system in which 
the community and the government share direct recurrent co3ts of health 
services. There are two main reasons for this . F i rs t ly , with c o s t - , 
sharing, more revenue would be available to operate health f a c i l i t i e s 
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Thus, addit ional f a c i l i t i e s can be constructed. Additional f a c i l i t e s 
w i l l o f course require an increase in provider costs ( i n th is case , an 
increase in recurrent c o s t s ) . However, the consumer c o s t s , in terms 
o f t rave l costs f o r example, would a l so f a l l . Thus, t o the extent that 
savings in consumer cos t s are larger than the increase in provider 
c o s t s , the cost-sharinp- system is more c o s t - e f f e c t i v e - t h a n the a l ternat ive system 
/ in which the recurrent costs are not being shared. Secondly, 
the addit ional revenue generated through cost -shar ing scheme can be used 
to improve the quality o f ex is t ing serv ices . The improved qual i ty o f 
serv ice can be converted into money terms, by determining peop le ' s 
The bene f i t attached t o improved serv i ces 
wi l l ingness to pay f o r improved servicesycan then be comj.ared with the 
revenue raised from the community (tkrough user f e e s , sale o f drugs e t c ) . 
If this revenue is smaller than benef i t o f improved se rv i ces , then c o s t -
sharing system is the c o s t - e f f e c t i v e system. As argued e a r l i e r , c o s t -
shr.ring is l i k e l y to reduce f r ivo lous demand for medical care , and hence 
promote e f f i c i e n c y in the u t i l i z a t i o n o f health f a c i l i t i e s . 
Thus, considerations o f consumer cos t s , health services quality and . ! • ' 
e f f i c i e n c y , make community-based health care system (with c o s t -
sharing) , more a t t r a e t i v e than the a l ternat ive system. 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS 
This sect ion summarizes the main conclusions o f the paper, 
a) To achieve the o b j e c t i v e o f 'health f o r a l l ' by the 2000 ( o r 
at some other acceptable t ime) , LDC Governments w i l l require 
addit ional resources in the health s e c t o r . ' The addit ional 
resources w i l l be needed t o increase population health 
serv i ces coverage from the current l e v e l o f 25-30 per cent in 
many LDCs t o 100 Per cent. The coverage gap that ex i s t s now 
i s too large to be f i l l e d by be t te r u t i l i z a t i o n o f the 
ava i lab le health resources alone. The two most promising 
sources o f revenue f o r the health sectors are the user fees and 
the uncommitted community resources. Uncommitted community 
resource is the income o f the community that i s not committed to 
provis ion o f basic needs, o r t o investments that are necessary 
to sustain ex ist ing standards o f l i v i n g . 
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User fees , i f imposed se l e c t i ve ly , and at appropriate l e v e l s , 
appear to be conducive to health services quality and e f f i c i e n c y . 
Se lect ive user fees could als^ promote equity in provision of 
health services f o r two reasons. F i r s t ly , they can be used 
to make everyone face the same probabi l i ty o f obtaining 
medical care when i t is needed. This i s because some sections 
o f the population which are within the proximity o f quality 
hospital services can be charged for those services , while 
leaving them free (at tht. time of use) to re ferra l jpatients 
from distant or poorly equipped c l i n i c s . 
Secondly, user fees can be waived f or those who cannot a f f o r d 
them. Recent experiments with -user fees in the Sudan suggest that 
user fees are an important potential source o f revenue for the 
health sector. However, the cost o f administering the fees 
in : /Sudan was not studied; in some countries this cost can 
be quite substantial. 
In addition to requiring additional domestic resources, the 
health sector also needs some irreducible quantities o f foreign 
resources in order to provide certain amounts o f health services . 
Unless foreign resources are avai lable in s u f f i c i e n t quantit ies , 
mobil ization o f domestic resources f o r the health sector may not 
lead to improvements in health services . 
In other words, f o r each domestic resource mobilized f o r the 
health sector , a certain amount o f foreign exchange is required 
to make i t fu l l y productive. This fact should be taken into 
account in the planning o f f inancial resources f o r Ministries 
o f Health. 
Ministries o f Health can use past values o f foreign aid and 
grants; user fees ; tax revenues; and uncommitted community resources 
predict the i r budgets. The predicted or expected budgets can 
then be used as the basis for planning health services . Rational 
health services planning is not possible without a sound 
planning o f f inancial resources. This is because production o f 
health services must o f ten begin before the Ministries o f Health 
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actually receive their budgets. In order f o r the Ministries 
to determine the various quantities o f service they should 
begin to produce, they must be able to predict the i r budgets. 
Financial health planning thus helps Ministries o f Health to 
plan provision, o f health services that is consistent with 
their budgets. Financial planning avoids s ituations 
where f a c i l i t i e s are bu i l t but are not operated due to 
recurrent cost problems; or cases where construction o f health 
f a c i l i t i e s is started but is not completed because o f lack o f 
funds. 
v 
Community-based health care system in which .communities 
share recurrent cost o f health services with the Government, i s 
the most c o s t - e f f e c t i v e way o f achieving good health f o r a l l 
within the shortest time possible . 
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NOTES 
1. It i s important to distinguish the concept o f uncommitted communiti' 
resource from the related notion o f untapped community resource frequently 
encountered in the l i t e ra ture . In economic terms, untapped community resource 
is uncommitted resource that i s not employed or fu l l y employed, but that 
which can be tapped or used for the production o f additional goods and 
services ( including health care ) , without s a c r i f i c i n g much, or any of the 
existing goods and services . In technical terms, the opportunity cost o f 
r e -a l l o ca t ing , or o f putting into productive use, the untapped community 
resource is v i r tual ly zero. In contrast , the uncommitted community resource 
i s assumed to be f u l l y employed in the production o f certain commodities 
(goods or s e rv i ces ) , or to be earmarked f or the provision of those commodities. 
The commodities at issue here are those that cannot be categorized as basic 
needs. They are largely luxurious items, or goods f o r conspicuous consump-
t ion . The uncommitted community resources can be re -a l l o ca ted , the oppor-
tunity cost o f re -a l l o cat ing them being the luxurious or "non-basic" 
commodities that are foregone in the re -a l l o ca t i on . This cost i s s t r i c t l y 
posit ive and non-negl ig ible . But, the concept o f untapped community r e -
source does not entai l a s a c r i f i c e o f commodities. It must be stressed that 
resources that are already committed to the provision of basic survival 
needs should not be re -a l l o cated . For example, the resources o f a given 
community that are committed to the provision o f basic housing cannot be 
re -a l located or mobilized to the Primary Health Care sector , without 
worsening the welfare o f that community. But the portion o f the community 
resource that i s used to purchase say, non-essential housing, could be 
mobilized or re -a l l ocated advantageously. For a community that i s just 
managing to meet the minimum basic survival needs, i t s uncommitted or un-
tapped productive resource i s zero. 
I t i s also useful to distinguish between uncommitted community 
resource and untapped community labour. Untapped community labour i s 
simply an element, i . e . a subset of the untapped community resource, which, 
as has been described above, i s a special case o f uncommitted resource. As 
i s explained in the text , the community resource cons is ts o f a bundle of 
a l l possible productive resources, including labour, land, machines, natural 
endowments e t c . Se l f -he lp , s e l f - r e l i a n c e , "Harambee'' e t c . , are other 
notions which require c l a r i f i c a t i o n in re lat ion to the concept o f uncommitted 
community resource. The se l f -he lp e f f o r t o f a community that i s beyond the 
i 
e f f o r t o f that community to provide for i t s basic survival needs i s not 
feas ib le unless the community is endowed with uncommitted resource. Again, 
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to use the example o f housing, a community that i s at the edge o f subsistence, 
would not w i l l ing ly , and on i t s own i n i t i a t i v e , t rade -o f f some o f i t s basic 
housing for basic health care services , because, i t would suf fer a loss in 
welfare. Such a community cannot mobilize resources from one sector to 
another without reducing production o f essential commodities in the other 
sector and hence i t s l eve l o f welfare. The analytical concept o f "uncommitted 
community resource" as used in this paper i s analogous to the notion o f "un-
committed resource at the hands o f Government" in Cost-Benefit Analysis 
l i t erature . See e . g . , I.M.D. L i t t l e and J.A. Mirrlees, Project Appraisal and 
Planning for Development Countries, (London, Heinemann, 1974-) and L. Squire 
and H.G. Van der Tak, Economic Analysis o f Projects (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1975). 
2. As pointed out in the text , subsidization o f drugs in community 
pharmacies would l ike ly create a black market f o r drugs, in which the sub-
sidized drugs would be bought, and then subsequently resold to private 
pharmacies at market pr i ces . The e f f e c t o f the existence o f black market 
for public ly subsidized drugs, would therefore be to reduce ava i lab i l i t y 
o f drugs in public health f a c i l i t i e s ( including community drug pharmacies). 
In fact the black market f o r subsidized drugs could wipe out the bene f i t s 
o f community pharmacies i f i t succeeds in making the pharmacies act as channels 
of cheap drugs to private medical pract i t ioners . 
Nonetheless, since a public subsidy to community pharmacies would 
make simple curative services available to v i r tua l ly everyone in the community 
it should seriously be considered on equity grounds. Moreover, the po l i cy 
o f public subsidization o f drugs for community based health care i s l i k e l y 
to be cheaper, or more convenient than an alternative po l i cy o f supplying 
essential drugs at market prices in community pharmacies, but which also 
requires an establishment o f a system of providing the same drugs f r e e - o f -
charge to those who cannot a f f ord them. 
It i s worth emphasizing that the major threat to the subsidized 
community pharmacies i s the emergence o f a black market for the drugs sold 
in those pharmacies. The emergence o f th is market can be prevented by care-
ful se lect ion o f pharmacy managers; by making these managers accountable to 
v i l lage health committees; by establishing a simple system o f accounting f o r 
essential drugs; by l inking community pharmacies to the nearest government 
health f a c i l i t i e s and ensuring that the pharmacies are regularly supervised 
by managers o f these f a c i l i t i e s ; by educating community members about the 
- 29 
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dangers o f a black market f o r community drugs, and urging them therefore , 
to report those engaged in i t to the v i l lage health committees; and by 
using moral and p o l i t i c a l persuasions to restrain private pharmacies from 
buying subsidized drugs from community pharmacies or from those who handle 
such drugs. The main issue here i s not whether subsidized community 
pharmacies have worked well in the past, but whether, given their potential 
bene f i t s , they can be made to function as desired. 
- 3 0 
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Appendix .1; INDEBTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LONG-TERM AND 
SHORT-TERM EXTERNAL DEBT RELATIVE TO EXPORTS 
AND TO GDP, 1978 .AND. 1985. 
Table A.1 Indebted Developing Countries 
INDEBTED DEVELOPING 
-COUNTRIES (BY REGION) 
Ratio of External. Deot to Exports 
of Goods and Services 
Percentage 
1978 1985 
Africa 
Asia 
Europe 
Nonoil Middle East 
Western Hemisphere 
124. 2 
81.0 
126.8 
161.5 
2l7.2 
166.0 
92.1 
.131.1 
225.3 
289. 4 
Source: Lancaster and Williamson (1936), 
Table 2.1, p.30. 
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Appendix 2: RANKING OF SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES ACCORDING 
TO DEBT OUTSTANDING, END 1985. 
Taule A. 2: Outstanding Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Country TOTAL DEBT 
(BILLION 
DOLLARS) 
DLBT EXPORT 
RATIO 
(Percentage) 
DEBT GDP 
RATIO 
(Percentage) 
Nigeria 
Sudan 
Ivory Coast 
2aire 
Zambia 
Kenya 
Tanzania 
Mozambique 
Zimbabwe 
Madagascar 
Seneg al 
Ghana 
Ethiopia 
Cameroon 
Somalia 
Mauritania 
Guinea 
Congo 
Mali 
Uganda 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Malawi 
Benin 
Togo 
Gabon 
Burkina Paso 
Mautitius 
Sierra Leone 
Burundi 
Botswana 
Rwa nd a 
Central African 
Republic | 
Guinea-Bissau 
Swaziland 
Gambia 
Chad 
Lesotho 
Comor os 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Dj ibouti 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Cape Verde 
Seychelles 
16. 6 
« . 3 
8.0 
5.3 
• 4 . 2 
3.5 
3.4 
2.6 
2.4 
2.3 
2.3 
2.2 
1.9 
1.8 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
1.3 
1.2 
1 . 2 
1.0 
1 .0 
0.9 0.8 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.6 
0.4 
0. 4 
0. 3 
0. 3 
0.3 
0. 3 
0.2 
0. 2 
0.2 
0 . 1 
0.1 
0 . 1 
0.1 
0.1 
0. 1 
0.1 
134.6 
1232.4 
238.1 
258. 3 
464.0 
224.8 
734 .3 
1518.6 
16 4.3 
634 .1 
285.1 
324. 9 
339. 4 
74.0 
909. 1, 
378.5 
254 .7 
105.2 
563.8 
279.2 
215.6 
322 .3 
343.0 
326.0 
315.7 
34.3 
366.6 
103.5 
314 
312 
38.8 
175.5 
,9 
, 3 
169. 1 
104 2.0 
75.6 
271, 
197. 
45 
625. 
3 
7 
,3 
9 
473.9 
53.0 
579.0 
212.8 
90. 0 
7 
1 
21.5 
100. 1 
116 J 9 
203. 5 
455. 3 
57.3 
62.5 
129. 2 
20.0 
101.8 
93.4 
21.2 
36.5 
21. 
205, 
215.0 
74.4 
60. 9 
138.4 
33.1 
103.8 
64.0 
78.7 
78.9 
114.7 
21. 5 
73.4 
63.1 
57.2 
40.2 
40.8 
19.6 
58 .0 
129.4 
57.8 
109.6 
256.0 
59.1 
123. 1 
125.7 
23.8 
295. 1 
96.7 
51. 7 
Source: Lancaster and Williamson (1986); pp.38-39, Table 2.8 
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Appendix 3: TRENDS IN RECURRENT AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE 
OF MINISTRY OF HEALTH, 1960-1984, KENYA. 
Table A.3: Kenya's Recurrent and Development Expenditure for 
MOH; and Gross Government Expenditure (in K£ mi Hit 
Year Rec uircnt 
Exp. 
Development 
Exp. 
Total M0I1 Total Gross 
Govt. Exp. 
1960 2.763 0.269 3.032 46.359 
1961 3.159 0.267 3.426 50.942 
1962 3.258 0.165 3.422 52.721 
19 6 3 3. 241 0. 171 3.412 56.477 
1964 2.895 0.159 3 .05 4 68.130 
196 5 3 . 128 0.14 2 3.170 70.540 
1966 3.554 0. 170 3.724 77.520 
1967 3.845 0.225 4 .07 0 84 .880 
1968 4 . 327 1. 107 5.434 96.050 
1969 4. 471 1. 172 5.913 104.97 9 
1970 6 .091 1.850 7 .941 121.461 
1971 6.818 3 .000 9.819 155.850 
1972 9. 340 2.183 12 .773 201.407 
1973 590 2 .183 12 .773 201.407 
1974 12.110 2.321 14.431 2 30.167 
1975 16.903 3 .327 20.730 301.582 
1976 19.522 4.772 24.295' 373.109 
1977 21.26 8 . 300 29.56 409.76 
1978 29.2lu 1 7 . 690 36.900 . 590.390 
1979 35 . 380 7.750 43.130 697.610 
1980 43.720 10.750 54.470 781.320 
1981 52.600 12.680 65.280 972.060 
1982 59.830 11.300 71.130 1122.320 
1983 62.370 7 . 700 70.07 0 1197.380 
1984 60.79 14.720 75.510 1296.460 
Nli: KE0.8 is approximarely equal to 1 U.S. Dollar 
Source: •Ikiara and Kimani (1986) p.30, table 5a. 
\ 
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Appendix 4: RECURRENT AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE AS A 
PROPORTION OF TOTAL GROSS EXPENDITURE OF ThE 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, 1960-1984, KENYA. 
Table A.4: Ministry of Health Expenditures (percentages) 
Year Reccurent 
Expenditure 
(%) 
Development 
Expenditure 
(%) 
Gross Exp. on 
Health as a 
Percent of Gross 
Govt. Expenditure 
(%) 
1960 91.1 8.9 6.5 
1961 92 .2 7.3 6.7 
1962 95.2 4.8 6.5 
1963 95.0 5.0 6.0 
1964 94.8 5.2 4.5 
1965 95.5 4.5 4.5 
1966 95.4 4.6 4.8 
1967 9 4.4 5.6 4.8 
1968 79.6 20. 4 5.7 
1969 80.2 19. 8 5.6 
1970 7 6.-7 23.3 6.5 
1971 69.4 30.6 6.8 
1972 76.4 23.6 6.8 
1973 82.9 17 .1 6 . 3 
1974 83.9 16.1 6.3 
1975 81.5 18.5 "6.9 
1976 80.4 19.6 • 6.5 
1977 71.9 28.1 7.2 
1978 79.2 , 20.8 6.3 
1979 82.0 18.0 6.2 
1980 80.3 19.7 7.0 
1981 80.6 19.4 6.7 
1982 84.1 15.9 6.3 
1983 ' 89.0 11.0 5.9 
1984 80.5 19.5 5.8 
Souroe: Ikiara and Kiinani (1986), p.132, table 5b. 
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Appendix 5: RBCURHENl" COST OF CONTINUING EDUCATION PROGRAM FOR 
HEALTH WORKERS IN TANZNAIA, 1984 
Table A.5: Recurrent Cost of Continuing Education for Health Workers, 
Tanzania, 1984 
Cost Item Foreign 
Exchange 
Expenditure 
(in T.shs) 
Local 
Currency 
Expenditure 
(T.shs) 
Total 
Expenditure 
(T.shs) 
1. Orientation Visist (Course) 1584.5 5233.8 6818.3 
2. Extension Course 
a) Baseline Surveys 
b) Training of Trainees 
1473.8 > 
8282.9 
5659.6 
28799.1 
7133.4 
37084.0 
3. Refresher Courses - Per 
course/average attendance 
a) Regional Medical Assistants 
course 4702.2 44862.7 49564.9 
b) Medical Assistants Course 5914.9 44757.1 50672.0 
c) Other courses 4872.5 42553.8 47426.3 
4. Distance Teaching 76995.0 55660.0 .32665.0 
5. District Library•Development 2354.4 2138.4 4492.8 
ND: T.shs.25 are approximately equal to 1 u.s. Dollar 
SOURCE: Dunlop, W.D., A Background paper on Cost, Management, and 
Economic Considerations of the Tanzanian Continuing Education 
for Health Workers Project, AMREF, January 1985, p.39. 
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Appendix 6: FOREIGN EXCHANGE SHARE OF TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 
OF GOVERNMENT HEALTH FACILITIES IN SELECTED POOR 
COUNTRIES 
Table A . F o r e i g n Exclinage Share cif Operating Costs fof Public 
Health Facilities, 1969-1981. 
Facility Type 1 Country Year of Estimate 
1969 1978/79 1981 I'1983 
Hospital Tanzania - 0.41 - -
Uganda 0.22 - - -
Health Centre Tanzania - 0.53 - -
Uganda 0.39 - - -
Indonesia 0.37-0.46 -
Other Rural 
Units Tanzania - 0.38 -
Sudan - - - 0.47 
Indonesia 0.22-0.51 
Source: Dunlop, D. W. and Over, A. M. (1986), p.9, table 1. 
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Appendix 8: PERCENTAGE OF CENTRAL EXPENDITURE ALLOCATED 
TO HEALV ! IN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. 
Table A. 8: Health' Expenditures as percent of Central 
Govermuer.t Expenditure in LDCs, 1978-1982. 
Country 
Malawi 
Botswana 
Mauritius 
Swaziland 
Canter oon 
India 
Burkina Faso 
Sudan 
Liberia 
Ghana 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Uganda 
Kenya 
Zimbabwe 
Brazil 
Health Expenditure — ^ 
(per cent of Total Expenditure) 
5.3 
5.4 
7.6 
G . l 
4.1 
1.9 
5.8 
1.5 
6 . 8 
6.5 
6 . 2 
7.0 
6.1" 
7.5 
6.1 
7.3 
TOTAL NON-OIL DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES | 4.1 
*These percer .u^ui; are based on approximations o f actual 
expenditure, figures. 
Source: Ikia:a and Kimani, p.11, table 1. 
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Table A. 9. 2; Health Sector Currfe-nt Expenditures for Botswana: Percentage Breakdowns, 1980 
SUMMARY TABlf 2(») HuAti mow tfial um*wn IVwmaja bnsUmm d Bi|m*turt> 
Mmavy ef Health 
Otfcrr ewirriw leal (Mw- rj'i kales Missions Industry 
local WlWUry bodies 
brad pnvata payments by iftfrvKjuals Iniufara 
SaVbalp' Btwr artvatl sourra; 
fotlyll art - atlnaal Fera^o a>4 - pntti Total 
TBichlng/nttiontl ref*rr*l hospml 40.00 22.22 2<K 
G«r>ertt hospiuls 52 00 100.00 80.00 23 61 668 24 42 
Long-»Uy hocpltll -
Menial hospital e.00 0.37 
Other institutions (tpacify) 
• Health cantres with medical ttatt 100 00 5 3t 4M 
Health centre! with paramedical.'nursins »taH M97 • 3 96 6 52 
Health posts with community health workers only 1 0 0 0 0 S.26 5 03 
Private practitioner 
Private dental services 
• Other private services (specify) 
Communicable disease control SO 98 485 
Domestic water supplies 6 0 00 1 8 6 6 1435 
Sanitation programmes I «.oo 13.79 • 1842 1.96 14 73 
Nutrition programmes 44 44 3 92 0.75 
Health education programmes 33 33 D.28 
Occup health programmes 
Other programmes (specify) 
Central laboratory service 20 00 0.93 
Travelling end transport 3.66 33.33 578 
Headquarters administration 
Training - doctors, dentists 
Training — other health staff 21.05 14 91 
Medical research - 3.92 0.37 
Other servtevs (specify) 
Transfers 
Total 100 <«i 100* 100\ 100* 100* 1 0 0 * 100* 1 0 0 * 1 0 0 * 100* 100* 
« 
! 1 
i i ; I I 1 i 1 J 
Source: A. G r i f f i t h s and Mil ls (1980), p.167. 
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Table A.9.3: Sources of Health Sector Finance for Botswana: Percentage Breakdowns, 19S0. * 
XUMMA*r74BU 1 (tM 
1 s a o a r trnmtl n f t t j l m 
Moury 
si 
. .. 
OMar 
aaa ar.TB 
Lax 
jovrMUM 
CfW 
r » Mtsser.s fctestry wlumary 
D»-r:: prviit 
paynmitj 
N ind-'vWiiiit 
lltsursfla 
Se-St!,. 
tttur pVstf 
soe-os 
Farnjn 
sd- t f foa! 
Feraigfc 
aid - arvjti Tatsi 
Teachmg'national 74 13 445 
12-23 7.41 1 78 100* 
General hospitals 60 47 1.30 12 28 
364 12.70 818 1 43 100% 
Long-stay hospital 87 04 2-32 
1064 - 100* 
Mental hospital 86 39 1.73 
11.88 100* 
Other institutions (specify) 
Services abroad | 1 8 85 * 265 88.50 100* 
Health centres 78 67 
356 6 67 11.11 • 100* 
Health centres with 87 67 2 03 7.24 
1.02 2.03 100* 
Health posts with community 81.03 18.92 
i o o * 
Private uractitioners 
85.71 14.29 100* 
Traditional health practitioners 
100.00 100* 
Private dental services 
71.43 28.57 100* 
Retail outlets 100 00 
100* 
Other private i t ..ccs 100.00 
100* 
IspeC'f,; 
Communicable disease control 30 77 68 23 
100* 
Domestic water supplies 57 69 
42.31 100* 
Sanitaton programmes 26 68 33.22 21.10 
16.61 2.49 100* 
Nutrition programme 4.24 a 47 -
0.85 84.75 1.69 • 100% 
Health education programmes 100 00 
100% 
Occup health programmes 37.50 
>2.60 
y 
f 100% 
Other programmes (speficy) 37.50 
6250 100* 
Central laboratory service 100 00 
100% 
Travelling and transport 10.07 53.96 2518 2H6 
6.47 0 72 1.44 100* 
Headquarters administration 72.30 0*4 16.13 566 
6 56 100% 
Training - doctors, dentists 15.79 
84.21 100% 
Trainig - other health staff 77.38 4.76 
17.86 100* 
Medical research 
Other services (specify) 
Transfers 
Total 28 00 12 65 8.50 3.13 
4.27' 0 16 33.66 i 
0.86 1.99 6.24 0.53 100% 
Table A .9 . 4: Geographic Distribution of Current ileaith Expenditures for Botswana by Spending Agency, 1980. 
T43U 11 5 
GioQiagnic brtjkdowm 
of «<E*ndilutsj lewunt) 
Ministry 
j ol Hun* j 
Othar 
•niiwstnes 
local 
i 30»rrrm*Bt 
Othar Slits 
hodias 
1 
Missions Industry Local voluntary DoOns 
• Oliect pnvst* 
< piynwnts 
1 by ,ndi«tdH«b 
1 J — 
Insurance 1 Salt Help nOMr pnvtu tourcas 
ForaifA 
| ad - official - prmaia Foul ; 
j - 1 • 
Headquarters and training 1.300 000 74.000 145.000 - 50 000 - - - 50.000 - { 310000 1.929 000 
Health services 
Total 
5.850 000 
7 150.000 
j 3.156.000 
| 3 230 000 
2.025 000 - 750.000 1.090.000 41.000 8.594.000 170 000 i 108.000 1.283,000 
* » • t 
136 000 23 903 300 ' i . 
41 000 8 534.000 220 000 I 508 000 h 4 I M O 25 532 000 j 
i 
I 
Health services - Urban 5.140 000 156.000 - - 900 000 15 000 3.110 000 150 000 1 480.000 108 00(1 - 10 059.000 
Health services - Rural 710000 3.000.000 2 025.000 750 000 190,000 26.000 5.484X0 20.000 j iaooo M75 000 
-
136 000 13 544 000 1 — ! 1 I 
Urban health serv. - Capital ciry 1.330.000 60.000 - ! 50.000 - 1.755 D00 100.000 r 24.000 1 3.319 000 
- Other towns 3.810000 96.000 - I 
1 
850.000 15000 1 355 000 50 COO 430.300 M.000 8 740 000 
i 
• 
I 
Rural health serv. - Va|. villages 300.000 2 350.000 1.435.000 ! 750 000 190,000 26 900 1.842.000 20 000 20 300 575.000 130 000 7 632 000 
- Other areas 410.000 650 000 540 000 - - - - 3 642.000 3500 1 600 000 36 300 
1 
5912 300 ( 
1 1 1 
I i J 1 
j 
Headquarters and training 18.2% 23% 6 7% - 6 3% - 22 7% - 19 5% j 
1 
7 6% 
Health servces 8i 8% 97 7% 93 3% - 93 3% 100% 
1 100% I0C% 77 3S j 100% 30 5% 100% 
1 
92 4 K 
Total 100% 100% 100% i lao'o 100% [ 1017^ '00% too% ! ioo% 100% 100% 100% 
j 
1 
i i 1 : 1 
Health services - Uroan 37 9% 49% - - _ 82 6 ' , J 36 6% i 36 2% i 88 2% j 54 5% : 8 4% I 1 42 9% ! 
I Health services - Rural 12.1% 95 1% j 100% j — •oo% 1 17 4% 
. . . 
63.4% 1 63 I 11 8% 5 5% J 91 6% IOO% 1 57 4% 
I I ! 
1 j i i 
Urbar. health serv. - Capital city 25 9% 1 - - _ 56% T r 43 6% I 56 7% _ • - • -22 2-i - 33 0% 
* Other towns 741% 1 r i 6i j — — _.. 1 54 4% • lOO"! j 56 4 - , 33 3% i 100% ! 77 8% ; 
4 I. 
_ I \rf 67 0% : 
• 
i 1 , i 1 i i f i — ' • • • •> ! i J 
. Rural health serv - Ma|. viilaaes i 
L 
42.3% | 78 3% ! 73 3% I - :00% i 100% j 1 — 1 J " j 100% | 71 4 * j 43 3% ' 
— » - • 1 
73 5% j 56.3% 
- Other areas | 
— 1 
57 7% i 21 7% | 26.7% I — i - ioo% y 56 4% ] - 23 6% 1 51.1% 25 5% 43 7S j 
| 1 ! 1 ! . . . . • • ! i f" 1 
1 
I . i i ; / . 
l_ 1 
1 / / I i 1 
— — — — — — — 
Source: A. Griffiths -and M. Mills (1982), p. 185. 
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•ROTES TQ TA3LES A, 9 .1 
Table A.9.1 attempts to answer the fol lowing question; How much 
i s spent on d i f f e rent categories o f health services by 
various organizations, Ministries or individuals? 
Table A.9.1 shows that the largest expenditure f o t the Ministry 
of Health ( (£ 2,960,000) in 1980 was spent on General 
Hospital Services. In contrast , other ministries spent 
their largest amount (P'-1,500,000) on Domestic water 
supplies. The spending patterns o f other agencies on health 
or health-related a c t i v i t i e s i s evident from table A.9.1. 
Table A.9.2 attempts to answer the fol lowing question: What 
percentages o f their t o ta l budgets, did various organizations, 
agencies, Ministries etc . spend on d i f f erent categories of 
health services? As- can be seen from Table A.9. 2, The Ministry 
o f Health spent 13.99% of i t s budget on the Teaching/national 
re ferra l hospita l ; 41.4% on General Hospitals; 1.4% on 
Health Education Programmes etc . The percentages spent by 
other Ministries- organizations and agencies are s e l f -
evident from Table A.9.2. Note in part icular that about 
49.5% o f the money spent by private households went to pay 
f or services o f t radi t ional healers. 
Table A.9.3: i s intended to answer the fol lowing question: How are 
d i f f erent categories o f health services or a c t i v i t i e s financed? 
Table A.9.3 ( l a s t row) shows that about 28% of the funds spent 
on the health sector came from the Ministry of Health; 
33.66% of these funds came from Direct Payments by Private 
Individuals; about 4.27% came from Industry; about 3.13% 
came from missions etc . It should be noted that some services 
are financed entirely by Government, while others are financed 
exclusivly by private households. Health Education Programmes 
and Central Laboratory Services are financed entirely by the 
Ministry o f Health. The services of t rad i t iona l healers and 
other pr iv - .e medical services are financed by private individuals . 
- H 5 -
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Table A.9.4: t r i e s to answer the following question: How are 
health expenditures made by d i f f e rent organizations distributed 
between urban and rural areas? The rural-urban distribution 
o f health expenditures i s evident from the second half 
o f Table A.9.4. Notice that about 87.9% o f the MOH 
budget i s spent on urban health services . 
